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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMIRALTY-DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT-EFFECT ON WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION R.EcovERIES-Decedent, aboard an airliner in his capacity 
as flight service supervisor, was killed when the plane crashed into the 
Pacific. Respondent airlines, decedent's employer, filed an application with 
the California Industrial Accident Commission to determine its liability 
under the California Workmen's Compensation Act.1 The commission 
awarded decedent's widow a death benefit despite the widow's objection 
to the commission's jurisdiction. Prior to the award the widow as admin-
istratrix of decedent's estate initiated this action under the Death on the 
High Seas Act2 (DHSA) in admiralty.3 On motion for summary judgment 
in respondent's favor, held, motion granted. DHSA is applicable to deaths 
arising from crashes of aircraft on the high seas,4 but it was not intended 
to supersede state workmen's compensation acts. Since the California com-
pensation statute may be constitutionally applied in the present case,5 and 
l Cal. Labor Code Ann. (Deering, 1953) §3600. 
2 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §§761-768. 
3 This court has previously held that admiralty is the exclusive forum for actions 
brought under DHSA. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, (N.D. Cal. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 85. 
This is the majority view, although the courts are not in agreement on the point. See, 
generally, comment, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 217 (1954). 
4 The fact that DHSA was enacted in 1920 indicates Congress probably did not 
consider its application to aircraft. Nevertheless, the courts have been unanimous in 
holding the act applicable. But, for an argument that the act should not be so applied, 
see comment, 55 CoL. L. REv. 907 (1955). Some cases have regarded DHSA as applicable 
by finding as a fact, actually or presumptively, that the impact causing the injury oc-
curred when the aircraft hit the sea, thus meeting the traditional "locality" test of 
admiralty tort jurisdiction which DHSA was said to adopt. See, e.g., Wilson v. Transocean 
Airlines, note 3 supra; Lacey v. L.W. Wiggins Airways, (D.C. Mass. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 916. 
The question whether DHSA also applies where it is shown that the impact occurred 
above the high seas has generally •been avoided. See, e.g., Noel v. Linea Aeropostal 
Venezolana, (2d Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 677, cert. den. 355 U.S. 907 (1957). But in a recent 
decision the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held it is immaterial whether 
the impact was on or above the sea. D'Aleman v. Pan American Vvorld Ainvays, (2d Cir. 
1958) 259 F. (2d) 493. 
5 It was argued that the application of the compensation act in the present case was 
unconstitutional under the doctrine of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 at 
216 (1917), where the application of a state compensation act to a maritime worker was 
disallowed on the ground that it interfered "with the proper harmony and uniformity 
of [the general maritime] law in its international and interstate relations." The court, 
however, found that the present case fell within the exception to the general rule, stated 
in Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission, 276 U.S. 467 at 469 
(1928), that where the employee is "not engaged in any work so directly connected with 
navigation and commerce that to permit the rights of the parties to be controlled by 
the local law would interfere with the essential uniformity of the general maritime law" 
the compensation act may ·be applied. It was said that decedent, a flight service supervisor, 
was "employed in a non-maritime industry and performed no maritime work." While 
the decision would undoubtedly stand in light of current judicial hostility to the Jensen 
doctrine [e.g., Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942)], the import of the 
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since its remedy is exclusive,6 it abrogates the DHSA remedy. King v. Pan 
American Airways, (N.D. Cal. 1958) 166 F. Supp. 136. 
Federal district courts have uniformly held that DHSA supersedes state 
wrongful death statutes,7 relying generally on a belief that DHSA was 
enacted to provide a uniform rule for recovery of damages for deaths on 
non-territorial seas.8 The wrongful death acts, being inconsistent with the 
uniformity which Congress sought to create, are therefore superseded. 
The question raised by the principal case is whether workmen's compensa-
tion acts are likewise inconsistent with the degree of uniformity Congress 
intended DHSA to create. Both DHSA and wrongful death acts give relief 
only upon a showing of fault, while workmen's compensation requires no 
such showing and provides a more certain basis for relief. The court in 
the principal case. found that the history of DHSA failed to show an in-
tention to supersede this "unique protection" of the compensation acts, 
and was unwilling to assume such a purpose, holding in effect that what 
Congress meant to supply was a uniform remedy for liability based on 
fault and not a single remedy for all deaths on the high seas. While there 
is no direct authority with which the present ruling can be compared, 
there is authority which by way of analogy presents an argument for the 
principal decision is not clear. It may ,be that the court would hold the same in regard 
to any airline employee, on the ground that such employment is never maritime and 
that "navigation and commerce" refers only to vessels. Or the court might mean only 
that the employment in the present case is not so "directly connected with navigation 
and commerce" because the employee in question, unlike a pilot, spent the major part 
of his working time on land. 
6 Cal. Labor Code Ann. (Deering, 1953) §3601. 
7 Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 1941 A.M.C. 483; Echavarria 
v. Atlantic & Caribbean Steam Nav. Co., (E.D. N.Y. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 677; comment, 25 
J. AIR LAW 102 (1958). But see Higa v. Transocean Airlines, (9th Cir. 1955) 230 F. (2d) 
780. This has been the ruling in spite of §7 of DHSA, 41 Stat. 538 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) 
§767, which provides: "The provisions of any State statute giving ... remedies for death 
shall not be affected .by this chapter." As originally proposed, the provision stated DHSA 
should have no effect on state remedies within the territorial limits of the state. This 
was changed by a last minute amendment removing the territorial limitation. Some 
members of Congress felt the application of state remedies to the .high seas would be 
unconstitutional under the Jensen doctrine, note 5 supra. The courts have therefore 
reasoned that some voted for the amended version because they felt the territorial limita-
tion superfluous, and not in order to make state remedies applicable. Since Congress' 
intent was considered ambiguous, courts have set the provision aside. See Wilson v. 
Transocean Airlines, note 3 supra; note, 28 So. CAL. L. REv. 78 (1954). The argument 
is equally applicable to workmen's compensation, with which the Jensen doctrine is 
directly concerned. 
8 This belief is dependent on the history of DHSA. In The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 
(1907), it was held that a state could apply its wrongful death statute to deaths on the 
high seas where the vessel involved was owned by a citizen of the state. When it became 
apparent that the state remedies were neither uniform nor applicable to all cases, DHSA 
was enacted. For a discussion of the history of DHSA, see Magruder and Grout, "Wrongful 
Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction," 35 YALE L. J. 395 (1926); Hughes, "Death 
Actions in Admiralty," 31 YALE L. J. 115 (1921). 
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contrary position. The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Employers 
Liability Act,9 which provides a remedy only where fault is shown, was 
intended to supersede state compensation statutes which do not require 
such showing.10 The same view has likewise been recognized in regard to 
the Merchant Marine Act of 192011 Gones Act), although the Supreme 
Court has not yet ruled on the question.12 It would seem, however, that 
the history of DHSA is sufficiently different from these statutes to justify 
the holding in the principal case. With regard to FELA, it is the silence 
of Congress on the subject of workmen's compensation in both the FELA 
and DHSA which supplies the necessary distinction. FELA was passed 
in 1908, two years prior to enactment of the first major state workmen's 
compensation law.13 At that time the intent to have FELA displace state 
negligence remedies was in effect the equivalent of an intent to make 
FELA the sole basis for relief. Congress spoke in terms of exclusiveness and 
complete uniformity without ever considering the effect on workmen's 
compensation. The Supreme Court seized on these statements in holding 
FELA the only basis for relief, there being nothing to show any intent to 
the contrary.14 Workmen's compensation acts were superseded, therefore, 
because Congress failed to say they should not be. But by 1920, when 
DHSA was passed, workmen's compensation was becoming common-
place.15 Under such circumstances the assumption from Congress' silence 
that it intended to displace the fast-growing compensation remedy appears 
much more dubious, for it is likely Congress would at ·least have debated 
the matter had it intended such an effect.16 The Jones Act decisions may 
likewise be distinguished on the basis of legislative history. The Jones 
9 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1952) §§51-60. 
10 New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917). 
11 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. (1952) §688. 
12 See Gahagan Construction Corp. v. Armao, (1st Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 301, cert. 
den. 333 U.S. 876 (1948), note, 29 Bosr. UNIV. L. REv. 116 (1949); Occidental Indemnity 
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 24 Cal. (2d) 310, 149 P. (2d) 841 (1944). Contra: 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Toups, (5th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 542, cert. den. 336 U.S. 967 
(1949); Beadle v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., (La. App. 1956) 87 S. (2d} 339, note, 
31 TULANE L. REv. 655 (1957). See also Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 at 47 (1930), 
containing often-cited dicta stating that the Jones Act supersedes all state laws on the 
subject. 
1a New York passed the first major workmen's compensation statute in 1910. This 
was declared unconstitutional in 1911, but was reenacted in 1913 following the amending 
of the New York Constitution. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §5.20 (1952). 
14 See New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, note 10 supra, at 150. 
15 By 1920 all but eight states had enacted compensation statutes. 1 LARSON, WoRK-
ME.N's COMPENSATION §5.30 (1952). 
16 This is particularly true in light of the fact Congress spent considerable time 
debating the effect of DHSA on state wrongful death acts with apparently no considera-
tion given to compensation statutes. See 59 CONG. REc. 4482-4486 (1920). 
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Act was enacted in 1920, the same year in which DHSA was enacted and 
three years after FELA had been held to supersede workmen's compensa-
tion acts. Congress then incorporated FELA into the Jones Act, in effect 
manifesting an intention that the Jones Act should have the same effect. 
The courts so holding have therefore a much stronger basis for finding an 
intention to supersede than is present in regard to DHSA, and those hold-
ings should not be regarded as applicable to the principal case. In the 
absence of more explicit proof that Congress intended DHSA to super-
sede the dissimilar and more certain workmen's compensation remedy, the 
assumption of such a purpose would be but doubtful judicial conjecture. 
The court in the principal case refuses justifiably to engage in such activity. 
But while the court was justified in its finding, it need not follow.· that 
it was correct in holding that such a compensation act, though made ex-
clusive by its language, abrogates DHSA. Congress might have meant 
DHSA and workmen's compensation to be concurrent remedies. The present 
decision leaves the applicability of DHSA, in areas where compensation 
acts are constitutionally applicable, to the discretion of the states. The 
court reaches this result by relying on Supreme Court decisions holding 
that state compensation acts abrogate general admiralty jurisdiction where 
the injury involved is a matter of local concem.17 Yet these decisions in 
regard to the abrogation of general maritime law remedies came after 
DHSA was enacted in 1920. To assume from its silence that Congress 
intended to have DHSA displaced by state compensation statutes because 
the general maritime law was later held to be displaced by such statutes 
is unwarranted,18 particularly where the practical effect is the suspension 
of a federal statute. There is, however, analogical authority in support of 
the court's holding to which it made no reference. Decisions holding that 
the Jones Act does not supersede state workmen's compensation acts have 
generally held that the compensation acts, if exclusive, do abrogate the 
Jones remedy.19 While this may not be the better rule, the analogy would 
at ·least support the principal case, for on this question the histories of 
the Jones Act and DHSA are indistinguishable. 
Thomas E. Kauper, S. Ed. 
17 Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926); Grant Smith-Porter 
Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922). 
18 Prior to 1920 at least one federal court had ruled that an "exclusive" state work-
men's compensation act did not abrogate a seaman's remedy under the general maritime 
law. Riegel v. Higgins, (N.D. Cal. 1917) 241 F. 718. 
19 Woods v. Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock & Repair Co., (S.D. Fla. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 
208; Fuentes v. Gulf Coast Dredging Co., (5th Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 69. The court deciding 
the principal case has so held. Surgeon v. Alaska Packers Assn., (N.D. Cal. 1939) 26 F. 
Supp. 241. 
